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‘Man Alone and Men Together: Maurice Shadbolt, William Malone 
and Chunuk Bair‘1 
 
JAMES BENNETT 
 It is hard to find a discussion of New Zealand culture in which John Mulgan‘s novel 
Man Alone (1939) does not figure… Actually, few of these figures are literally men 
alone, as that thematic is joined to a second great Australasian motif, that of mateship.‘2 
 
A man alone could not survive.
3
 
 
This article will consider the motivation behind, and timing of, Maurice Shadbolt‘s 
interventions as a writer between 1982 and 1988 to determine the extent to which cultural 
nationalist interpretations of Gallipoli resonated in that decade and how they came about. My 
argument will pivot around Shadbolt‘s powerful 1982 stage play (Once on Chunuk Bair), 
subsequently adapted as a low budget feature film (Chunuk Bair), and his later collection of 
oral histories.
4
 As Annabel Cooper points out, although a dramatic production Once on 
Chunuk Bair is a very conscious attempt to anchor a creative piece in history by drawing 
extensively on the work of historians to buttress the veracity of its interpretation of the event.
5
 
To develop this line of argument further, Charlotte Caning has conceptualized performance 
on stage as a site for negotiation of the meaning of history by deliberately blurring the 
boundaries between historiography and dramaturgy.
6
 Although my principal cultural interest 
lies in history through film, the centrality of Shadbolt and his stage play to the Gallipoli 
debate in New Zealand necessarily broadens the scope of my discussion on cultural forms to 
include relevant stage plays as a supplementary interest to fiction feature films. The 
entwinement of New Zealand and Australian history on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915 - 
through the integrated command structure as well as interwoven historiographical narratives - 
also means that any analysis of this debate will benefit from transnational and comparative 
approaches.
7
 Accordingly, the article will also make strategic reference to the most influential 
contemporaneous Australian cultural nationalist text, Peter Weir‘s seminal 1981 feature film 
Gallipoli, to throw the particularity of New Zealand political and cultural circumstances of 
that era into sharper relief.
8
 As film – and theatre – is a cultural artefact of the period of its 
production, the discussion will alternate between two pasts, that is, the era of their production 
– the 1980s – and the moment in time that they represent artistically – 1915. 
 Gallipoli is surely one of the most well traversed paths in Australian historiography, and 
Anzac continues to occupy a dominant cultural space on both sides of the Tasman (especially 
Australia), resuscitated and repackaged in the late-twentieth-century for a new generation that 
in turn has embraced the tradition with gusto.
9
 Indeed, such is the potency and reach of Anzac 
that it functions as a white Australian creation myth, one whose commemorative culture has 
shifted away from its British Empire roots to an ‗ahistorical celebration‘ of men who fell for 
the nation.
10
 Yet the simplicity of dominant narratives embedded in popular texts belies the 
striking complexity of the entire campaign and, more particularly, the August Offensive. This 
is the moment in the campaign that Shadbolt – and Weir – chose to pivot their creative work 
around; it is also a moment that begs further historiographical scrutiny.  
 The entwinement and dissemination of New Zealand and Australian narratives in relation 
to understandings of 1915 – especially the August Offensive – is a useful departure point for 
this discussion. The seminal force shaping Australian narratives was of course C.E.W. 
(Charles) Bean, war correspondent and later author of the impressive multi-volume Official 
History series. Bean has been criticized by many contemporary Australian historians for 
promoting a very selective interpretation of the Australian digger that filters out negative 
 47 
Journal of New Zealand Studies NS13 (2012), 46-61. 
traits and presents him in a highly favourable light as the successor to the Australian bushman 
with all of the virtues invested in that national archetype.
11
 Yet, Bean‘s work has also been 
seen as quite revolutionary in the sense that his are bottom-up histories reflecting his time in 
the trenches on the frontline. Bean in turn was enormously influential in shaping the work of 
historians Bill Gammage (The Broken Years, 1974) and Patsy Adam-Smith (The Anzacs, 
1991), all of whose work emphasizes the individual.
12
 Similarly, Weir and his screenwriter 
David Williamson were influenced by Bean‘s narrative and by Gammage as the film‘s 
historical consultant.
13
 Jenny Macleod has also made the cogent observation that 
revitalization of Anzac in Australia and the strength of emotional engagement with that 
tradition is in no small measure due to the intervention of journalists – above all Jonathan 
King and Les Carlyon – who have produced a number of popular histories.14  
 In contrast, New Zealand‘s war correspondent, Malcolm Ross, who took up duties in 
May 1915, was considered to lack the technical understanding to undertake the task of 
writing the official war histories and was therefore passed over in favour of New Zealand 
field officers. Their histories were produced under a tight censorship regime and were far less 
effective in serving New Zealanders than were Bean‘s in the Australian context.15 Writing in 
1979, Bill Gammage argued that unlike Australia, New Zealand lacked a distinguishing 
national tradition about Anzac with no national shrine the equivalent of the Australian War 
Memorial. However, Gammage‘s argument oversimplifies the distinctions. As in Australia, 
New Zealand had a pioneer myth and the record of Kiwi soldiers at war upheld that tradition. 
That the myth was essentially conservative in substance can be seen in the frequent claim to 
New Zealand soldiers in the Great War as the ‗gentlemen of the bush‘.16 Second, New 
Zealand also has a Gallipoli tradition albeit one that would come to incorporate some 
Australian borrowings including introduction of the dawn service in 1939.
17
 It is 
comprehensible that Australia, the more senior Dominion whose forces far outnumbered the 
New Zealanders in the campaign, would assert more stridently their claim to Anzac and 
Gallipoli as a crucible of nationhood. To some extent the effect has been to pre-empt New 
Zealand claims to Anzac as a core national identity. It is also the case that Gammage‘s analysis 
overlooks popular usage of ‗Anzac‘ in Australia; namely, its co-option as short-hand for all things 
Australian, maintaining a silence in regard to the ‗NZ‘ embedded in the acronym.
18
  
 Until publication of Christopher Pugsley‘s groundbreaking text on Gallipoli in 1984 
(Gallipoli: the New Zealand Story), Anzacs with the lemon squeezer hats lacked a 
comprehensive and nuanced history of their own that documented, without fear or favour, the 
role of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade in the campaign.
19
 New Zealanders would also 
feature in other accounts such as Bean‘s but only in a fragmented sense. And much later – at 
a popular level – in the absence of an equivalent New Zealand screen text, the many re-
screenings of Weir‘s film in New Zealand also influenced popular understandings of the 
campaign on that side of the Tasman; ironically, Weir‘s depiction of events in early August 
1915 managed to airbrush out Kiwis in an operation where New Zealand advances on 
Chunuk Bair were coordinated closely with the Australian diversion at the Nek rather than 
with the falsely contextualized Suvla Bay landings emphasized in Weir‘s representation.20  
 Through the recovery of veterans‘ voices, several New Zealand historians – notably Jock 
Phillips and Nicholas Boyack – have pointed to a clear bifurcation in New Zealand Great 
War narratives, namely, the hegemonic top-down official narratives (inscribed in the official 
published histories and on war memorials) and the unofficial or counter-narrative version that 
emerges so strongly in soldiers‘ diaries and letters.21 This is not unlike the dialectic of 
disparate but sometimes intersecting traditions in Australia, that is, the Australian official 
conservative Anzac legend versus unofficial digger folklore.
22
 Shadbolt‘s Voices of Gallipoli 
contains a sample of this counter-narrative. One of the striking threads running through these 
interviews is a bitterly critical tone that condemns, in forceful terms, the failure of leadership 
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and strategy throughout the campaign. There is little doubt that New Zealand politicians of 
the day like Australian-born Defence Minister, Sir James Allen, were well aware how 
Gallipoli would be read by future historians.
23
 However, veterans‘ voices were suppressed by 
dominant official narratives that overwrote a sense of betrayal at the hands of British High 
Command.
24
  
 Contrasting trans-Tasman attitudes to Churchill, first Lord of the Admiralty and one of 
the architects of the Dardanelles strategy, is instructive. Boyack, for instance, has shown that 
assessments of Churchill by New Zealand Anzacs failed to percolate through to the general 
population, and this only increased the bitterness of surviving men. Australian views – 
reinforced by a traditional lack of sympathy for imperial Britain from the Irish diaspora and 
reflected in the tradition of the radical Bulletin newspaper – were similar in character; though 
the place of Churchill in Australian public memory is more complex and problematic, 
especially in the light of his role as wartime leader of Britain in the 1940s. Joy Damousi has 
highlighted paradoxical Australian narratives of Churchill. The official version lauded him as 
wartime hero, genius and saviour. This perspective ran in tandem with a widely disseminated 
counterview of Churchill as the bungler of the Gallipoli campaign who abandoned 
Australians in 1942 and opposed the return of Australian troops from the Mediterranean at a 
critical moment in the defence of their homeland. Tellingly, the ‗widely popularised counter-
myth‘ of Churchill, Britain and the Empire at war would later provide sustenance for the 
work of screenwriter David Williamson, historian David Day (and others), as well as the 
political rhetoric of Prime Minister Paul Keating in the 1990s.
25
 More broadly, this process 
underlines the trans-Tasman disjunction on how the campaign came to be interpreted and 
remembered.
26
 
 There are two ways of thinking about this. On the one hand, New Zealand journalist and 
author Graeme Hunt has argued from a nationalist perspective that New Zealand was slow to 
come to terms with its past – at least this episode in its past – when most Australians, 
historians included, had come to the conclusion before the Second World War that it was the 
folly of British High Command that caused such a monumental disaster.
27
 Hunt‘s argument, 
though, oversimplifies the nature of Allied failings and ignores, for example, the fact that 
Australian commanders were very good at killing their own troops, and that some New 
Zealand and Australian officers were poor leaders or, as in the case of the New Zealand-born 
imperial officer, Brigadier General Francis Johnston, simply unfit to command.
28
 As James 
Belich has observed, New Zealand civil and military leaders were relatively ineffectual in 
shielding their men from the harsh reality of the British military code in what amounted to a 
‗slaughter system‘.29  
 The other way to read contrasting New Zealand and Australian interpretations of the 
campaign would be – to follow the argument of Pugsley – that until relatively recently there 
has been a striking imbalance in much of the Australian historiography on Anzacs and an 
excessive emphasis on the cult of the hero.
30
 The almost universal appeal of the Australian 
bush myth in First World War literature is critical to understanding the dominance of heroic-
romantic narratives in the Australian Anzac tradition. Whilst it is quite true that a New 
Zealand rural mythology also existed, as observed earlier the pre-eminence of the Australian 
bushman in national status and iconography did not find a direct parallel in New Zealand.  
This literary nationalist tradition that big noted Australian military prowess had its origins in 
the pre-war era and was given significant impetus by Bean and his war contemporaries.
31
 
New Zealanders tend to be much more cautious in using heroic discourse; the traditional 
emphasis has instead been on the fallen, a practice mirrored in many of the nation‘s 
memorials to the 1914-18 war which can be interpreted as a form of ‗surrogate tombstone‘.32 
Colonel William George Malone, leader of the ill-fated Wellington battalion on a day of 
carnage on Chunuk Bair, is exceptional: he stands out as a successful leader and the resolute 
 49 
Journal of New Zealand Studies NS13 (2012), 46-61. 
hero who fell in a desperate defence of the highest point in the Allied assault on the Sari Bair 
range. Unusually for a New Zealand officer, Malone has been a significant subject of 
attention by Australian military historians especially in the recent past: John Crawford for 
instance notes 20 references to Malone in Les Carlyon‘s popular book on Gallipoli.33 
 The interest of historians and creative artists in 1915 and its broader significance to New 
Zealand society reignited passionately in the early 1980s after a long decline in the tradition 
of Anzac dating back to the 1960s and the divisive backdrop of social and political dissent in 
the Vietnam War era. Maurice Shadbolt recognized that the ‗old mythology of Gallipoli‘ was 
moribund and that the tradition needed to be re-examined ‗in a fresh, human and very vivid 
light‘. His work in collaboration with Christopher Pugsley led him to the conviction that there 
was a firm basis for revitalizing public memory of the event.
34
 A shift was underway on the 
other side of the Tasman around the same time where cultural producer Peter Weir was 
stirred to make his landmark feature film as a reaction against a tradition of Anzac shrouded 
in the rituals of Empire and Britishness that had so disaffected him and many of his 
contemporaries. This process helps to explain the key traits of cultural nationalism and anti-
Britishness embedded in Weir‘s film in contradistinction to an earlier era and an epoch-
defining film in Charles Chauvel‘s 1940 feature Forty Thousand Horsemen, one that showed 
‗a jocular though not anti-British attitude to the English‘.35 
 Curran and Ward have mapped out the transition of Australia to a post-imperial nation, a 
phenomenon that also took root in other British world communities including New Zealand. 
Their particular contribution is to identify the ‗new nationalism‘ of the 1960s and 1970s as a 
critical phase in the transition process, one that was frequently beset by vacillation and 
confusion, not because there was no popular desire to replace the old imperial symbols and 
structures but on account of the paucity of ‗viable, popularly sustainable alternatives‘.36 This 
reflected the climate of uncertainty about precisely how to fill the void of British global 
decolonization. The nadir of Anzac day in the 1960s was tied to the perception of a martial 
event with a commemorative culture that had dramatically narrowed in its popular appeal, too 
much so for it to any longer constitute a genuine national day. This divided community 
response to Anzac Day during the 1960s and 1970s‘ hiatus was captured effectively in 
Australian playwright Alan Seymour‘s dramatic stage play, The One Day of the Year (1961). 
Significantly, there was almost no support in this period for the view that Anzac Day could 
be a plausible conduit for the new nationalism.
37
  
 The seeds of New Zealand‘s resolute political and cultural nationalism of the 1980s were 
sown in the previous two decades. Belich‘s now familiar conceptual apparatus of 
‗decolonisation‘, a period that can be narrowly defined from 1973 to 1985, is a useful means 
of apprehending a series of very significant economic and social shifts in the structure of late-
twentieth-century New Zealand society.
38
 Of all the Dominions, none had been so intimately 
tied to Britain in both trade and sentiment as New Zealand. This tightening of relations (or 
‗recolonial‘ bonds in the style of James Belich) between New Zealand and Britain, 
entrenched in the late-nineteenth-century, began to loosen perceptibly in the 1970s and the 
intensity of these bonds was matched by the trauma that attended their decoupling.
39
 The year 
1973, when Britain gained formal entry to the European Economic Community (EEC), makes 
a symbolic marker of the process (as was the announcement of Britain‘s withdrawal east of 
Suez by 1970-71), although as Belich observes, this had been prefigured by developments in 
the 1960s.
40
 Robert Muldoon‘s stewardship of the country in the critical years from 1975 to 
1984 witnessed a King Canute-like attempt to hold back an irresistible tide of change; to 
some extent this only masked the decolonial metamorphosis that was in full swing by the 
time Muldoon was eventually defeated in 1984 by David Lange‘s fourth Labour government.  
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 While Australia‘s experience of Britain‘s retreat from a global reach was less traumatic 
than was New Zealand‘s and some other parts of the former Empire, Curran and Ward 
observe that ‗the fundamental dynamics were remarkably similar‘.41 Protracted British 
negotiations in the early 1960s over EEC membership elicited some highly emotional 
impulses from Australian leaders of the day, and government and media made known their 
displeasure at the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act that unravelled the traditional 
principle of free entry into Britain. However, there was little sense of ‗material hardship‘ in 
Australian attitudes to post-imperial Britain and its lurch toward Europe by the early 1970s, 
and feelings of abandonment dissipated more quickly than in New Zealand.
42
  
 Stuart Murray and Ian Conrich have noted a connection between decolonization and the 
transition to cultural independence in New Zealand beginning in the 1970s.
43
 The renaissance 
of a home-grown film industry from 1977 is one of the markers of this transition. As in 
Australia, the British and American imported product dominated the big screen in the post-
war years. Local productions were few in number and the fragile local industry struggled to 
find investors and audiences. An important component of the cultural renaissance on the big 
screen lay in its capacity to present ‗our own image‘. This was encouraged by the formation 
of respective film commissions in the 1970s – initially in 1970 in Australia and 1978 in New 
Zealand – to support the growth of indigenous film production along with significant 
encouragement to investors in the local product through incentives built into the taxation 
system.
44
 
 These surface level commonalities between the two settler societies should not obscure 
some fundamental differences between them in an era of decolonization and a shift toward 
cultural independence. First, whereas a number of key works of Australian film and 
television in the revival period centred on Australians in overseas wars (especially the First 
World War), one struggles to think of equivalent subject matter in New Zealand cinema. A 
foundation concern of that industry rested on relations between colonizer and colonized, a 
lineage that can be traced back to the ‗father‘ of New Zealand cinema, Rudall Hayward, and 
his groundbreaking epics on the New Zealand Wars from the 1920s. Much New Zealand 
cinema of the late 1970s and early 1980s echoed anxieties in relation to the nation‘s 
unfinished colonial business – a subject barely touched on by Australian filmmakers of the 
day.
45
 At the same time, retaining some emphasis in cultural forms on the First World War 
predicated on the fiction of Māori equality through soldier citizenship and unity of the two 
races at war against a common external enemy, would provide a soothing narrative and 
another technique for occluding an uneasy and unsettled colonial past.
46
 
  Furthermore, whereas Indigenous Australia was still, at best, peripheral to the 
consciousness of most white Australians, the 1970s marked the beginnings of a political and 
cultural renaissance among Māori that would later be reflected on the big screen by Māori 
film makers. Murray notes the coincidence of this shift toward cultural independence and a 
frequent unease in articulations of the national imaginary that partly turned on scrutiny of 
Pākehā culture and questions about legitimacy of the foundations of Aotearoa New Zealand 
as a settler society.
47
 This interrogation of the national spirit in a decolonizing era is perhaps 
nowhere better crystallized than in Mereta Mita‘s activist feature length documentary of the 
1981 Springbok rugby tour, an event that was marked by greater civil conflict than at any 
time in the nation‘s history since the Great Strike of 1913. The context of the tour was a 
growing coalescence between the Māori renaissance and ‗an emergent middle-class Pākehā 
political consciousness‘. By the time of the tour the tiny social movements of the 1960s had 
broadened their support base substantially; moreover, the causes they pursued – including 
opposition to the tour and to nuclear weapons – had become interwoven in complex ways 
with nationalism.
48
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  Significantly, Mita‘s hard hitting cinéma-vérité documentary makes an explicit link 
between the racism of apartheid South Africa and racism at home. Maurice Shadbolt was 
active in anti-tour protests and at least one scholar has interpreted his play, her criticisms of it 
notwithstanding, as a possible ‗gesture of reunification‘ in the wake of these serious 
divisions.
49
 The link between solider citizenship of the Māori Battalion and colonial warfare 
is explicitly referenced in Shadbolt‘s stage play through the character of Otaki George, a 
descendant of Te Rauparaha, leader of the Ngāti Toa tribe renowned for their role in the 
Musket Wars of the early-nineteenth-century. Otaki George is deployed to underscore the 
superficiality of biculturalism. In so doing, Shadbolt calls up an identity based on a common 
Māori-Pākehā mythology.50  
 By contrast, Weir‘s uncritical re-presentation of a classic version of the Anzac Legend 
embeds egalitarianism (and therefore unity) whilst effacing Aboriginal presence in the 
national story both at home and abroad.
51
 Moreover, the film‘s success at the box office in a 
decade that represented the high water mark of celluloid Anzac productions including the 
television mini-series Anzacs (1985) and The Lighthorsemen (1987), demonstrated aptly how 
unvarnished and insular nationalist sentiment and mythology could resonate with a popular 
audience.
52
 In that sense Shadbolt‘s stage play and Weir‘s film mirror strongly divergent 
national preoccupations with history and culture in the 1980s: one acknowledged colonial 
conflict and the relationship between two peoples in the founding of a nation while the other 
played up the bush as central to the national imaginary, in the process undergirding the 
historical narrative of terra nullius. Ann Curthoys has pointed to a number of rival non-
Aboriginal victim narratives in Australian popular historical mythology, foremost among 
which is the Gallipoli campaign. As she suggests, these stories of the white settler as victim 
militate against overt recognition and awareness of a colonial past, and they in turn implicate 
the nature of ‗white racial discourse‘.53 
 In truth, Shadbolt was not the first New Zealand creative artist to take up Gallipoli as 
subject matter. Playwright, filmmaker and cultural activist Paul Maunder formed the avant-
garde theatre ensemble Amamus in 1971 in Wellington. Maunder and Amamus were 
adherents of Polish experimental theatre director and innovator, Jerzy Grotowski and their 
one act play, Gallipolli – An Evocation, first performed in September 1974, became almost 
synonymous with the life of the theatre company.
54
 A spartan production featuring a 
combined male and female cast that spanned a mere 45 minutes, Gallipoli was staged inside a 
square made by walls of white calico making use of a single prop – a .303 rifle. The play was 
performed more frequently than any other Amamus work both in New Zealand and abroad 
where it was brought to the stage in London and four centres in Poland including Wroclaw, 
home of Grotowski‘s Theatre Laboratory. Unlike the 1980s cultural nationalist texts at the 
core of this paper, the radical Maunder-Amamus stage-play contests the status of Gallipoli as 
the birthplace of the (new) masculinized nation, an idea long established in Australian 
historiography albeit less stridently so in the New Zealand case where there was no 
equivalent of the radical nationalist Bulletin newspaper with its propagation of bushman 
masculinities and nationhood.
55
 Questioning of this entwinement is exemplified in the 
Ottoman soldiers‘ chorus at the beginning of the play, reprised at the end, that is, ‗A Kiwi. A 
peasant. A barbarian. A child.‘56 In other words, Kiwi is analogous to a colony clinging to 
dependendence on its mother country. As in an earlier Amamus play, one character, in this 
case a digger called simply ‗Kiwi‘, is scapegoated. Kiwi charges at the Ottoman enemy and is 
shot dead. The remainder of the cast, who initially play the role of Ottoman soldiers, turn 
Kiwi over and summon up the dead to uncover the spirit of the departed Kiwi. This involves 
examining a series of relationships between Kiwi and his various contemporaries, 
interspersed with periodic returns to Ottoman forces on the battlefield, producing a complex 
and very layered piece of theatre. The dynamic of audience relationship was critical to the 
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impact of the play; the ensemble did succeed in creating an impact, although the play drew a 
divided critical response.
57
  
 The 1980s marked a shift in novelist Maurice Shadbolt‘s oeuvre towards the use of New 
Zealand military history as a vehicle for his writing projects, beginning with a Gallipoli 
dimension in the 1980 novel, The Lovelock Version, his only play, Once on Chunuk Bair 
(1982) and Voices of Gallipoli, published in 1988, a non-fiction work that included 
interviews with a dozen veterans of the campaign.
58
 In the last mentioned work Shadbolt 
recounts the profound emotional experience in 1977 of visiting the Gallipoli peninsula and a 
classical theatre in nearby ancient Troy, site of Homeric myth making. What struck him was 
the asymmetry between the significance of Anzac day on the calendar and the absence of 
major artistic forms in ‗national cultural life‘ whether poetry, music, literature or paintings. 
Shadbolt wanted a play that encapsulated the New Zealand experience in one day. 8 August 
1915, when Kiwi soldiers briefly seized Chunuk Bair, the high point of the Sari Bair range, 
from Ottoman forces would be that day: one that had long since been erased from national 
consciousness through a collective amnesia. His intention in writing a play was to create a 
‗living memorial‘ to the fallen New Zealand Anzacs at Gallipoli, framing his intention in 
very similar terms to Peter Weir who was determined to create a ‗celluloid memorial‘ to 
slaughtered Anzacs.
59
 The play‘s dramatic arc – following the format of a classical tragedy in 
its unity of time, place and action – would provide a catharsis to ‗let the dead go‘.60 
 Shadbolt‘s play also sought to rehabilitate William Malone, an outstanding leader and 
exceptional New Zealander; the man whose reputation had been unfairly sullied by his 
malign commanding officers, Brigade Major and later Colonel, A.C. Temperley and 
Brigadier General Francis Johnston.
61
 The discrediting of Malone owes much to the voice of 
his surviving superior officer, Temperley, whose version of events between 6 and 10 August 
was essentially accepted at the time by his superiors, Godley and Hamilton.
62
 On the request 
of Charles Bean, Temperley gave the Australian war correspondent a briefing on the narrative 
of the New Zealand Brigade in the battle for Chunuk Bair in late 1918 or early 1919, and then 
developed that account in the early 1920s.
63
 In this narrative Temperley cast aspersions on 
Malone‘s abilities as a military commander and, more critically, condemned the key decision 
of the Wellington Battalion commander to site trenches on the reverse (rather than the 
forward) slope of the ridge when seizing the summit on 8 August, essentially claiming that 
this action had fatally compromised the ability of Allied forces to defend the heights of Sari 
Bair.
64
 Others present on Chunuk Bair at the time as well as military historians have rebutted 
Temperley‘s contentions; however, the Englishman‘s perspective became ingrained in key 
historical narratives of the New Zealand Brigade, including the work of Bean and John North, 
in the process besmirching Malone‘s name for the best part of a century.65 Fred Waite‘s text 
The New Zealanders at Gallipoli, part of the popular history series on New Zealand in World 
War One, mentions Malone‘s death in passing, but has nothing to say about the 
circumstances that led to this moment.
66
 As John Crawford has noted, the controversies 
surrounding Malone and the battle for Chunuk Bair (as well as its defence) long eclipsed the 
achievements of the Wellington battalion and its leadership.
67
 In 1965 English historian 
Robert Rhodes James was the first to refute the claims of Hamilton, Temperley and others in 
relation to Malone‘s mistaken strategy in siting trenches on Chunuk Bair; until publication of 
Pugsley‘s 1984 book on New Zealanders at Gallipoli, Malone‘s actions were not widely 
understood.
68
 That process of growing awareness was further supported by the publication of 
Shadbolt‘s play and release of the subsequent film adaptation.69 
 One of the most revealing aspects of Temperley‘s narrative is his silence on Malone‘s 
confrontation with himself and Johnston on the morning of 7 August.  This followed the 
critical mistake of Johnston in delaying the advance of the New Zealand Brigade on Chunuk 
Bair early that morning – thus obliterating the critical element of synchronicity required to 
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coordinate their attack with the left assault column and the Australian Light Horse feint at the 
Nek, immortalized in Weir‘s film.70 Malone had already witnessed the slaughter of several 
hundred men in the Auckland Battalion, was aware of Johnston‘s condition and showed a 
rare strength of character in this campaign to refuse his superior‘s order (in turn, acting on 
orders from the remote and ineffectual General Alexander Godley) to attack up hill in broad 
daylight without artillery or machine gun support.
71
 Malone‘s confrontation with ‗two British 
officers‘ (almost certainly Johnston and Temperley) was corroborated by several men and 
one, Corporal Charles Clark, overheard Malone say: ‗I will take the risk and my punishment. 
These men are not going until I order them to go. I‘m not going to send them over to commit 
suicide.‘72 Malone held the line in his insistence that the Wellingtons would advance from the 
Apex to capture Chunuk Bair before dawn the following morning. Whilst a disciplinarian and 
fervent imperialist who put great emphasis on duty and work and a leader who demanded the 
very highest standards from his men, Malone‘s response to his superiors at this tense moment 
is evidence of his forceful character, fair mindedness and high regard for the welfare of the 
men who served under him.
73
 And while a devout Catholic of Anglo-Irish heritage who was 
critical of British leadership in the campaign, he saw himself and his men in the revered 
tradition of British military heroism; indeed, he could imagine ‗no better death‘ than the one 
fate dealt him.
74
 
 A recurring motif that emerges from veteran interviewees in Voices of Gallipoli is the 
strong conviction that Gallipoli marked a decisive turning point for New Zealand: no longer 
would there be an unquestioning subservience to Empire. This is the strident voice that the 
writer aligns himself with and enacts in his postcolonial text for the stage. Shadbolt also 
identifies closely with William Malone and his response to Australian comrades. In deference 
to the wishes of his family, Malone is not a character in the stage play, but elements of him 
and several others form the composite character of Colonel Connolly whose love of country 
(rather than the love for his spouse documented in the Malone diaries and letters) is 
foregrounded.
75
 Whereas most New Zealand soldiers underwent a transformation in the way 
they viewed their Australian counterparts between training in Egypt and fighting side by side 
on the slopes of Gallipoli, Malone was unusual insofar as he retained significant doubts about 
the quality of Australian diggers even after April 1915.
76
 The commander of the Wellingtons 
also continued to be concerned about the occlusion of a distinctive New Zealand identity 
through deployment of the term ‗Australasian‘ and the merging of Australians with New 
Zealanders in a joint –New Zealand-Australian Division.77 Shadbolt not only airbrushes out 
other Allied formations (notably 7
th
 Gloucester and 8
th
 Welch battalions), but also employs 
the following dialogue as a corrective to the numerically superior Australians who are 
perceived by Malone to threaten the distinctive achievements of New Zealand units: 
 
BASSETT: General Sir Ian Hamilton regrets that thus far the offensive has failed to 
take Achi Baba or Koja Chemen Tepe, but he rejoices in the shining triumph upon 
Chunuk Bair by – I‘m sorry, sir, you aren‘t going to like this. 
CONNOLLY: Go on. 
BASSETT:  By the magnificent Australians ... 
CONNOLLY: The what? The who? 
BASSETT (apologetic): By the Australians, sir ... (Weaker) The – magnificent 
Australians. 
CONNOLLY: What Australians? Where? 
BASSETT: He doesn‘t seem to know it‘s New Zealand up here, sir.78 
 
 Speaking on an ABC Four Corners report in 2008 about memory, history and Allied 
involvement on the Western front, Professor Gary Sheffield of Birmingham University made 
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the significant point that New Zealand has been one of the losers in projecting its voice 
forward in the battle for history and memory.
79
 Shadbolt was all too aware of this. In that 
sense it is worth considering for a moment his motivation for the Voices of Gallipoli project, 
which came some years after the play. In an interesting synchronicity, Shadbolt and military 
historian Christopher Pugsley met while each was working on their respective project in the 
early 1980s – Pugsley on his history of New Zealand‘s Gallipoli experience and Shadbolt on 
the play. The latter was approached by Allan Martin, then Director-General of Television 
New Zealand, to play a lead role in the production of a TV documentary on the campaign. 
Asked to script it, Shadbolt declined, but he agreed to interview veterans if he could work in 
association with Pugsley. The host of the series turned out to be ex-General Sir Leonard 
Thornton and the jarring of his approach with Shadbolt‘s soon surfaced. Thornton envisioned 
the documentary series as a ‗martial saga‘, thereby denying the tragic human dimension that 
Shadbolt saw as so central to the story he was trying to convey. Thornton also questioned – 
not entirely without cause – the reliability of some of the old veterans and their memories.80 
The force of Thornton‘s personality ensured that the series bore his imprimatur, the final cut 
ignoring the Pugsley-Shadbolt script. For Shadbolt, this was just one more cynical 
overwriting of the veteran voice, and a refusal to allow New Zealanders, in his own words, ‗a 
clear-eyed confrontation with their past‘.81 The experience left Shadbolt feeling enormously 
frustrated and one that he saw as largely a ‗wasted opportunity‘ but for valuable interviews 
with the aged veterans, material that would would later form the core of his non-fiction 
book.
82
 
 Before assessing the timing of Shadbolt‘s key literary work on Gallipoli – Once on 
Chunuk Bair – I want to first consider its ideological import, beginning with an assessment of 
Peter Weir‘s parallel text. Gallipoli is perhaps best seen as a visual exemplification of the 
Anzac Legend with its emphasis on mateship, sport, landscape, the virtual invisibility of all 
but the white male, and the airbrushing out of any other Allied formations. It functions as a 
key tract in one strand of late-twentieth-century Australian nationalism: its anti-British 
sentiment. Weir‘s film tapped into popular Australian memory that the entire campaign can 
be attributed to systemic British bungling and incompetent leadership.
83
 It also functioned as 
a pivotal moment in transformation of the conservative Anzac Legend from its close 
association with the imperial ethos into a national story in which the British rather than the 
Turks (who are barely seen on screen) are identified as the real enemy.
84
 Weir‘s feature film 
is pre-eminent among three Australian screen texts made between 1980 and 1984 that were 
all inspired by radical nationalist understandings of Australian involvement – and its costs – 
in fighting British wars. In so doing, they echoed the dominant reading of the ‗post-imperial 
generation‘ in that country.85 
 Similarly, the Gallipoli experience provided a blueprint in Shadbolt‘s mind for a new, 
more confident nationalism that strove to assert the nation‘s mana. He also conceptualized the 
1980s as a time when New Zealand was ‗reconsidering traditional connections, and defying 
bullying allies‘, specifically Britain, France, the United States and even ‗erstwhile fellow 
Anzacs‘ across the Tasman who were widely viewed by their smaller neighbours as pawns of 
American military power. Shadbolt was quite explicit that his objective was not only about 
telling New Zealand stories: 
 
… the play – as I saw it then, and as it was to be later – is only ostensibly about New 
Zealand‘s fatal day on Chunuk Bair on August 8, 1915. It was really about New 
Zealanders – and New Zealand – seventy years on. Had it not been I should have 
interested myself in another project.
86
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New Zealand historians have noted that the upsurge of interest in Anzac Day during the 
1980s revealed a popular belief that war and national identity were interconnected. This 
understanding was reflected in key external events such as the ANZUS crisis of 1985 as well 
as in an anti-nuclear consensus that would culminate in bi-partisan support for a nuclear-free 
New Zealand by 1989-90.
87
 At home the correlation between war and national identity was 
mirrored in the continuing output of books, plays and documentaries by Shadbolt, Pugsley 
and their contemporaries.
88
 At the same time, pacifist concerns of the 1960s social 
movements were catapulted to mainstream consciousness by the 1980s, symbolized by strong 
support for the Lange Labour government‘s rejection of American nuclear policy. Following 
close on the heels of Once on Chunuk Bair, Shadbolt became committed to the view that 
Gallipoli offered an important didactic lesson for contemporary New Zealanders; failure to 
confront the issues risked repeating the mistake of ‗confining Gallipoli to a military-historical 
ghetto‘ and, ultimately, denying its meaning to the present.89 
 As with the auteur Peter Weir, an element of anti-Britishness cannot be decoupled from 
the nationalist treatise. Shadbolt draws on the mythology propagated by Hamilton and other 
commanders, and repeated by many scholars, that the August Offensive was a near miss, and 
that the New Zealanders – or more particularly the Wellingtons – were the key to Allied 
victory, had they only been reinforced at the critical moment rather than being let down by 
the insipid tea-drinking English at Suvla Bay and their incompetent commander, General 
Frederick Stopford.
90
 He also restates the traditional view that Malone was killed by a shell 
from a British destroyer: according to Pugsley, it is more likely he was hit by New Zealand 
artillery.
91
 That said, Shadbolt nevertheless eschews the romantic sentimentality and 
sanitization that pervades Weir‘s text. The novelist-cum-dramatist instead opts for a gritty 
and unsentimental approach that foregrounds lice, flies, dysentery (the ‗Gallipoli gallop‘ as 
he dubs it), and other atrocious conditions that plagued the men throughout 1915. Critics have 
also praised the strong and effective use of irony as a dramatic device and Shadbolt‘s skill at 
infusing dialogue with the distinctive New Zealand vernacular and humour.
92
 These elements 
combined to make the stage play a compelling piece of theatre when first performed at the 
Mercury Theatre in Auckland in 1982.
93
  
 Both race and class boundaries are introduced in the text and are intended to be resolved 
as the drama reaches its catharsis.
94
 Perhaps the most contentious element of the play is its 
unreflexive restatement of traditional gender hierarchies at precisely the same historical 
moment that New Zealand society was being remade with growing recognition of plural 
identities constituting the body politic. There are two facets to this critique. The first concerns 
the text‘s interrelationship between masculinity and national identity – a restatement of 
orthodox historiography – at an historical juncture when a decolonizing New Zealand was 
scrutinizing its relationship with its erstwhile ‗mother country‘. A gendered dichotomy is 
constructed between a feminized, passive, tea drinking English leadership and regulars on the 
one hand and a masculinized filiality on the other that repeatedly harks back to the all-male 
communities delineated in Jock Phillips‘ A Man’s Country? Moreover, the text articulates an 
obvious contempt for the maternal sexual behaviour that occasions a second betrayal: that is, 
the playwright aligns British abandonment of New Zealand in the 1970s with British betrayal 
of New Zealand soldiers on the heights of Chunuk Bair in August 1915.
95
 
 
HARKNESS (shaken again): I still believe in it, sir. 
CONNOLLY: In Homer? 
HARKNESS: In the Empire, sir. Despite everything ... Sacrifice will be 
remembered, sir. 
CONNOLLY: Sacrifice? 
HARKNESS: I mean by the motherland, sir. 
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CONNOLLY: Balls. 
HARKNESS: Sir? 
CONNOLLY: Mothers have been known to go whoring off for the highest price. 
HARKNESS: Whoring off, sir? 
CONNOLLY: Deserting their offspring, Harkness. 
HARKNESS: We can't be forgotten — not altogether. Not altogether, sir. 
CONNOLLY: Then, Harkness, we do even better ...
96
 
 
The second dimension to this attempted ‗remasculinization‘ of the nation can be detected in 
an unambiguous expression of traditional Pākehā male sexual identity at a time when fissures 
had opened up and traditional masculinity became subject to interrogation in a range of 
significant contemporaneous cultural texts, most notably in Greg McGhee‘s Foreskin’s 
Lament.
97
  
 In 1991 Shadbolt‘s play was adapted as a feature film called simply Chunuk Bair. Unlike 
Weir‘s Gallipoli, a key film in the Australian revival that received the backing of a 
production company part owned by media magnate Rupert Murdoch, Chunuk Bair was made 
by a first time director, Dale Bradley, and was brought to the big screen on a shoestring 
budget without any support from key national screen agencies, the New Zealand Film 
Commission and New Zealand on Air. Gallipoli‘s production values were highly polished, it 
offered a superb evocation of the Australian landscape, and its dramatic qualities appealed 
very effectively to an international audience even if British critics objected to the film‘s 
ideology.
98
 In this sense Weir‘s screen text significantly overshadows its New Zealand 
equivalent. Yet for all of these apparent advantages Gallipoli is also a highly sentimental, 
romanticized and, at base, less honest rendition of Gallipoli mythology than is Chunuk Bair. 
Weir‘s film is a restatement of most key elements of the Anzac Legend, adding an anti-
British bias not evident in earlier visual texts whilst excising the traditional martial dimension 
of the legend.
99
 There is a continuity in Chunuk Bair‘s deployment of particular strands of 
Gallipoli mythology from the Shadbolt play, but it nevertheless manages some 
reinterpretation of old material by reference to fresh historical scholarship, notably Pugsley‘s 
1984 book and that historian‘s passionate input as a key consultant to the production. The 
film also gets close to the heart of Connolly‘s dilemma (read William Malone) with its 
dramatic focus on his refusal of Johnston and Temperley‘s order that the Wellington 
Battalion advance on the summit of Chunuk Bair in what amounted to a suicide order. As 
outlined earlier, this moment was mostly hidden from history and constituted a key element 
of Malone‘s rehabilitation. 
 The technical deficiencies of Chunuk Bair and a failure to employ semiotic devices to 
successfully transpose the stage production to celluloid ensured that the feature film would 
not realize Maurice Shadbolt‘s ambition to create a fitting screen memorial to the bravery of 
the Wellington Battalion. The film relies mostly on very artificial studio-bound sets, there are 
problems with structure and lighting, the camerawork exults in its own amateurishness and 
the failure to build tension even at critical moments all work to weaken the impact of the 
screen text. One critic also commented on the narrative confusion of the screenplay in the 
first half.
100
 Overall, Chunuk Bair has the feel of a claustrophobic theatrical piece that does 
not successfully translate what was widely viewed as a powerful stage play on its debut into a 
celluloid production that relates a critical moment for New Zealand infantry in the campaign. 
 In conclusion, this article has focused on a key but transient phase of New Zealand 
cultural nationalism in the 1980s built on the edifice of Gallipoli and its bountiful tradition of 
myth making set against the backdrop of the country‘s external fissures and anxious 
transition into a postcolonial era. The key architect of this cultural moment was novelist, 
briefly-turned playwright Maurice Shadbolt whose interventions in history were synchronous 
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with those of leading military historian Christopher Pugsley. Although the pattern and shifts 
in Anzac commemorative culture showed some broad similarities to Australia through the 
twentieth-century, there were nevertheless significant differences between the two countries 
in the construction of public memory and the cultural context in which popular historical 
mythology was constructed. Radical nationalist interpretations of Australian enmeshment in 
British wars resonated powerfully with the national psyche and this accounts for why screen 
texts on Anzacs were both pervasive and enduring. Although Shadbolt‘s nationalism was 
similarly inspired by the ideology of filial betrayal, on the other hand his nationalism was 
galvanized by a search for differentiation from an Australian identity. Furthermore, the 
circumstances surrounding the discrediting of Colonel William Malone‘s name provided a 
powerful and very particular ancillary motivation to Shadbolt who envisioned his work as 
part of a campaign to restore the honour of the fallen man. In that objective he was ultimately 
successful even though he would not live to see this moment. As illustrated, some critics have 
also pointed to his failure to address gender hierarchies in the text at a time of significant 
social change as evidence of an attempted remasculinization of the nation. However, to 
assert, as some have, that Shadbolt‘s play is just as guilty of distortion as Weir‘s screen text is 
difficult to sustain on the basis of the evidence outlined above.
101
 
 Histories of the campaign and related cultural productions have much to gain from 
comparative and transnational analyses as is already evident from the new revisionist 
scholarship and international documentaries of the early-twenty-first-century.
102
 Although at 
one level the strength of reaction to a tragedy of such epic proportions is perfectly 
understandable, for too long this episode has suffered from the blinkered gaze of nationalism 
that confines many depictions – especially but by no means exclusively the popular ones – to 
an historical ghetto riddled with parochial blind spots and omission of other stories of being 
an Anzac.
103
 In a trans-Tasman context there has been a greater tendency for this to happen in 
Australian writing and cultural productions on the campaign where the First World War 
remains ground zero for the collective memory of war and a culture of commemoration. The 
first decade of the new millennium has witnessed a clear shift in historical representations 
that make a critical attempt to situate the campaign in a more complex, holistic and, 
ultimately more truthful, way. How successful this trend will be in reinterpreting the 
campaign to a mass audience in the face of a populist, ahistorical juggernaut that valorizes 
heroism, sacrifice for the nation and nationalist sentiment, remains to be seen. 
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